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ABSTRACT
U.S. nuclear weapons force structure accounts for the number and types of strategic
and nonstrategic weapon systems in various locations that comprise the nuclear
arsenal. While exact numbers, locations, and detailed designs remain classified,
motivations for the current and future of the nuclear arsenal is presented as a
unique integration of logical technical and political information. The dynamic that
results from military requirements, physical design limitations, and congressional
response to balance deterrence with stockpile reductions has not produced the
necessary level of change in the post-Cold War environment of the 21st century. As
such, a stagnant position on nuclear weapons reductions diminishes the effect of
U.S. global nonproliferation efforts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS & POLICY
The analysis of nuclear weapons can be approached from two vantage points,
physics and sociopolitical psychology. A nuclear weapon is the materialization of
complex physical processes which induce a nuclear explosion harnessing an
unprecedented amount of energy. The manipulation of fear that results from their
potential ramifications explains the use of nuclear weapons in national defense. In
an effort to explain the logic behind the interest in and importance of nuclear
weapons analysis, this section provides an overview of this two-toned approach to
nuclear weapons.
1.1 DEFINITION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON
A nuclear weapon is broadly defined as a nuclear warhead within a weapon
delivery system. The nuclear processes within the warheads differentiate them; an
atomic bomb is generally considered a fission device and a thermonuclear weapon,
a fusion device. However, modern weapons involve both fission and fusion
reactions. In fission weapons, both reactions are involved in a process known as
boosting. Fusion fuel in the center of the fissile pit releases neutrons upon
implosion which increase the amount of splitting atoms, thereby increasing yield. In
thermonuclear weapons, fusion usually occurs only after fission reactions release
enough energy to induce the pressure and temperature conditions required to
initiate fusion.
Fission weapons explode when fissile material, such as uranium-235 or
plutonium-239, becomes supercritical via a gun-shot assembly or implosion device.
These methods are shown in Figure 1 (1).
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Figure 1: Methods for Igniting a Fission Explosion: Gun Assembly (top) & Implosion (bottom)
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In the gun assembly weapon, two separate pieces of fissile material are shot
together to form a mass in which the rate of neutron production exceeds that of
neutron loss. The same concept applies in the implosion technique during which
the surrounding high explosive compresses the heavy metal increasing density
while decreasing surface area. This effectively decreases the amount of fissile
material required to produce comparable yields.
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Alternatively, the fusion weapon explodes via a two or three-stage fusion
assembly. Example fusion reactions that are applicable to nuclear weapons are
represented below (2):
Li + 'n -_+ He + T + 4.7 MeV
(Eqn. 1)
D + T -+ He + n + 17.6 MeV
(Eqn. 2)
In Eqn. 1, Li-6 combines with a neutron to form a helium atom, tritium and energy.
Eqn. 2 shows the fusion of deuterium and tritium to produce helium, a neutron, and
energy. The schematic of a two-stage thermonuclear weapon is shown below in
Figure 2 (1).
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Figure 2: Two-stage thermonuclear weapon system
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The two-stage fusion weapon shown above has a fission primary on the left and a
fusion secondary on the right. In this particular system, the conventional explosive,
the outermost part of the primary sphere, results in the implosion of a plutonium
core. The middle layer in the primary consists of beryllium, which serves as a
reflector to decrease the percentage of neutrons lost. X-rays produced from the
fission reactions flood the interior of the aluminum weapon case, a polystyrene
filled radiation channel that separates the primary from the secondary. The
temperature and pressure conditions that result are high enough to ignite a fusion
reaction in the lithium-deuteride fuel.
1.2 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENSE POLICY
Defense policy encompasses the governmental decisions, actions, and strategies
to protect and actively defend the welfare of the country, its institutions, and its
citizens. The most severe form of defense is the use of weapons of mass destruction,
notably nuclear weapons. One model of the policy-making process consists of four
stages: input, communications channels, conversion structures, and output,
illustrated in Figure 3 (3).
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Figure 3: Defense Policy Process Model [3]
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The inputs are needs, wants, demands, expectations, and supports that highlight
a necessity for change or innovation in the specific policy area. An example of an
input in nuclear weapons policy is the increased expectation for weapons
reductions in the post-Cold War environment. The inputs become apparent by the
work of the communication channels. These influencing bodies include interest
groups, the media, and public opinion. One such interest group that is responsive to
the aforementioned input is the Arms Control Association. Conversion structures
are the parts of the US government, the President, Congress, and the bureaucracy
that take the information from both the inputs and communications channels to
produce outputs. These outputs are the actual strategies, policies, and programs
that respond to the original inputs. (3) This model of defense policy is unlike other
policy areas in that these stages of decision-making occur between international and
domestic environments, overlapping with both foreign affairs and security policy.
Nuclear weapons policy is further differentiated from the rest of defense policy in
that the inputs are highly controversial while the communications channels and
conversion structures combine to include, and to a greater extent rely on, scientists,
nuclear weapons experts, and the military. As opposed to other areas of US social
policy, or even defense policy, the decisions concerning nuclear weapons are not
largely dependent on an American social force. Legislators are then required to
adapt their decision-making role in concert with the technical and military drivers.
In effect, the singularity of nuclear weapons policy results from inherent
complications in this model thus potentially diminishing the efficiency of the policy
process.
Nuclear weapons policy encompasses several areas, such as declaratory,
operational, force structure, security, and nonproliferation. (4) Declaratory policy
determines what information is disclosed to the public. Operational policy
determines when, where, and how different types of nuclear weapons are to be
employed, or used. Force structure policy outlines the types and amounts of
weapons in domestic and international locations that make up the arsenal. Security
policy refers to the security and safety of the nuclear weapons, whether on a
military base, a submarine, or in the dismantling process. Lastly, nonproliferation
policy protects against the misuse of nuclear weapons, especially in regard to 'non-
nuclear states' as determined by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
2. THESIS FRAMEWORK & FOCUS
The culmination of the Manhattan project into the first nuclear test in 1945
introduced a controversial era of nuclear weapons. A part of the federal budget and
military agenda as well as a means to induce large-scale psychological fear, the issue
of nuclear weapons continues to raise debate both politically and socially. The
aftermath of 9/11 fueled innovation in government, such as the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security in 2002, at the same time intensifying this
nuclear fear and controversy. The catastrophic event ignited domestic and
international concern of possible nuclear attack by a rogue nation or terrorist group.
The resulting heightened security and defense atmosphere of the 21st century
further complicates and calls into question existing and changing US nuclear
weapons policy.
In the second half of the 20th century, the US developed hundreds of nuclear
weapon types, yet only few remain in today's arsenal. This thesis aims to answer
the following questions:
* Which nuclear weapon types make up today's nuclear arsenal?
* What are the driving factors that shape nuclear force structure policy?
* What is the international effect of changes to US nuclear force structure?
Building on the foundations of nuclear physics and definition of force structure
policy discussed in the previous sections, chapter 2 outlines the types of warheads
in the stockpile and briefly overviews the domestic and international locations of
weapon systems and stockpile work. Chapter 3 focuses on the technical and
political motivations behind nuclear force structure in terms of military
requirements, design limitations, and legislative control. This dynamic not only
controls how nuclear force structure will be shaped in the future, but also the ability
of the US to balance the need for deterrence with the pressure for reductions.
The objective of this thesis is first to provide an overview of the US arsenal,
and second, to analyze the main influences on force structure. Force structure
analysis is important for two reasons. First, dedication to the proper engineering of
nuclear warheads is imperative to the safety and security of the country. Second,
the US sets a precedent in the international community in regard to nuclear
weaponry and the efforts of nonproliferation. The motivation for writing this thesis
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stems from the foundations of nuclear engineering in that nuclear weapons couple
the most fundamental with the most complex principles of physics in the design of a
nuclear system. Thus, a technical and political understanding of the current status
and future directions in force structure policy is essential in the ability to motivate
change.
II. CURRENT NUCLEAR FORCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE
1. OVERVIEW
In order to fully understand force structure, and likewise what precisely
constitutes the US nuclear arsenal, this section aims to clarify certain key terms.
One commonly used distinction in the description of nuclear weapons is the
strategic versus nonstrategic classification. The US nuclear arsenal, summarized in
Figure 4 (5), includes both weapons systems.
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THE U.S. ARSENAL
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ACM: advanced cruse missile; ALCM: ar-launched cruise mssi e; ICBM: interconinental ballistic missile;
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launched balistic missile.
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scheduled to begin in March 2008.
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"Apprcx matelýy 1,260 additicnal warheads ae ii reserve, and roughly 5,150 await cismantlemert. Spawes are
nai counted by the administration as operational warheads.
Figure 4: US Nuclear Arsenal [5]
The distinction between strategic and nonstrategic weapons is important, but not
always clear cut. Range generally determines this difference, although the DOD
formally defines strategic missions versus nonstrategic nuclear forces as the
following (6):
Strategic mission: A mission directed against one or more of a
selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of
progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's
war making capacity and will to make war. Targets include
key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical
material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems,
communication facilities, and other such target systems. As
opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are
designed to have a long-range rather than immediate effect
on the enemy and its military forces.
Nonstrategic nuclear forces: Those nuclear-capable forces
located in an operational area with a capability to employ
nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing
forces, supporting installations, or facilities. Such forces may
be employed, when authorized by competent authority, to
support operations that contribute to the accomplishment of
the commander's mission within the theater of operations.
Based on these definitions, strategic weapons typically harness more energy and
thus, destruction. Moreover, there are significantly less nonstrategic than strategic
weapons. (7) As a result, most controversy and policy decisions about nuclear
weapons in the US concern strategic, rather than nonstrategic, forces.
These terms classify the entire nuclear weapon system, which is roughly an
explosive nuclear component within the delivery vehicle, such as a missile, that
arms the jet, submarine, or other mode of military transportation. The nuclear
material is referred to as the warhead, which is designated by a "W" or a "B" for
bomb. (2) The specific types of warheads and bombs comprise the stockpile, which
is tabulated in Figure 5 (8).
U.S. stockpile
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Figure 5: US Nuclear Stockpile [8]
The difference between a nuclear weapon and a nuclear warhead is attributed to the
presence of a delivery system; the weapon includes the warhead and its associated
delivery system. Whether the delivery system is long-range or short to medium -
range categorizes the nuclear weapon as strategic and nonstrategic respectively.
2. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Strategic nuclear weapons, which deliver long-range capabilities, include
intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy
bombers. The three types of strategic nuclear weapons made up the former
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"nuclear triad". Currently, they constitute only one part of the "new triad", shown in
Figure 6, established by the 2004 Nuclear Posture Review.
Non-nuclear and nuclear strke capabili-bes
Defenses Responsive
Infrastructure
Figure 6: New Triad 2004 [9]
Prior to 2004, nuclear forces were arranged in the triad shown at the top of the
pyramid, consisting of solely ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. The Bush administration
attempted to decrease the emphasis on nuclear weapons by arranging them in
concert with conventional weapons.
2.1 INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM)
Historically, intercontinental ballistic missiles have had ranges between six
and eight thousand miles. (2) The missile systems have evolved from the
complicated Atlas system, of which only certain modifications were briefly deployed
from 1960 to 1965, to the currently deployed Minuteman III missiles, as shown in
Figure 7 (1):
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
Force Development
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Figure 7: ICBM Force Development (1945-1990) [1]
Not shown in the figure above is the period between 1990 and 2008, during which
time Congress funded $14 million towards the retirement of the Peacekeeper
missiles. (10) In general, ICBMs have three phases: boost, ballistic, and reentry. The
first phase uses fuel to propel the missile out of the atmosphere at which point it
enters the second phase, the ballistic trajectory towards the target. The reentry
vehicle in the third phase allows the missile to reenter the atmosphere after which
the nuclear warhead is able to be detonated.
The ICBMs in the current stockpile are Minuteman III missiles carrying the
W62'/Mk-12, W78/Mk-12A, and W87/Mk-21 warheads/reentry vehicles (Figure 4:
US Nuclear Arsenal). The characteristics of each warhead, such as yield, weight, and
numbers per missile are included below in Table 1 (2):
'According to Figure 4, the W62 warheads are to be fully dismantled.
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Table 1: Characteristics of ICBM Warheads Currently
Warhead/RV Yield Weight (lbs.) No. per RV
(kilotons)
W62/Mk-12 170 700-800 2-3
W78/Mk-12A 335-350 <800 2-3
W87/Mk-21 300-4752 -- 10-12
Since the end of the Cold War, reductions have been made, as shown by the
retirement of the Peacekeepers and downsizing of the current arsenal. Today's
arsenal holds "approximately 764 [warheads] with a goal of 500 warheads on 450
missiles by the end of 2012." (5)
2.2 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE (SLBM)
With a range comparable to ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles
make up "close to 38 percent of the operational nuclear arsenal." (5) Preceded by
the Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident I as shown in Figure 7, today's current SLBM force
consists of Trident III/D-5 missiles carrying two types of warheads, the W76 and
W88.
2 The yield is increased to 475 kilotons through an additional sleeve of enriched U-235. (2; 18)
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Figure 8: SLBM Force Development (1955-1990) [1]
Table 2 outlines
W88/Mk-5.
characteristics of the two warheads: the W76/Mk-4 and the
Table 2: Characteristics of SLBM Warheads
Warhead/RV Yield
(kilotons)
Weight (lbs.)
SLBMs patrol both US coasts, playing the primary deterrent role. Their
locations depend on targeting policy. Recently, balance has shifted to the Pacific due
to the increased targeting in places such as China, and decreased attention on
Russia. With this purpose in mind, there is a substantial dependence on these
particular warheads. Unfortunately, technical experts have publicly raised concerns
for each type.
T I C4
TRIDENT 11 D-5
19770 1975 1980 1985 11990
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The W76, a 30-year old weapon, has generated an impetus for nuclear
scientists to refurbish or replace it completely. Among its various weaknesses, its
thin uranium casing is prone to hydrodynamic, or more specifically Raleigh-Taylor,
instabilities, in which a lighter density fluid flows into a higher density fluid at a
constant rate. (11) The resulting ripple effect has the potential to prevent intended
detonation of the lithium-6 deuteride fuel. (12) While this problem is highly
debated within the scientific community, the age of the weapon is assumed to
decrease reliability and safety.
The newer W88 entered the stockpile with concerns already present. One
such concern pinpoints a lack of safety features. First, the high explosive (HE) used
as opposed to the insensitive high explosive (IHE) does not account for accidental
detonation. Second, the W88 contains a non-fire resistant pit. A probabilistic risk
assessment proves that a fire resistant pit is a necessary measure to protect against
"the accident scenarios...in which nuclear weapons are involved in a hydrocarbon
fuel fire of such intensity and duration as to breach the pit and thereby disperse the
plutonium due to combustion followed by the entrainment of the plutonium oxide
particles into the fire plume." (13) This called for a pit production capability in
order to replace the existing pits. A new W88 was developed by Los Alamos
National Laboratory and approved by NNSA in June 2007. (14)
2.3 STRATEGIC BOMBS
Strategic bombs are employed on aircraft that have long-range capabilities,
in parallel the strategic force criteria. Two aircraft, the B-2A Spirit and B-52H
Stratofortress, carry the B61-7, B61-11, and B83. The delivery system of the W80 is
either the advanced cruise missile (ACM) or air-launched cruise missile (ALCM),
which arm the B52.
Table 3: Characteristics of Strategic Bombs
Bomb Yield Weight (lbs.)
(kilotons)
B61-7,11
B83
W80-1,3
10-350 695-716
Up to 1200 2400
Up to 150 290
Table 3, as shown above, provides the characteristics of each weapon. The
B61-7 is an upgrade from the Mod 1 and is sometimes referred to as the "dial-a-
yield" weapon for its multiple yield choices. The B61-11, the "bunker-buster" is an
upgrade of the B61-7 due to its ability to penetrate 3-6 meters underground. The
B83 has the advantage of a very large yield, which corresponds to a large weight of
2400 pounds. Its advantage is the ability to deliver the weapon at high speeds and
low altitudes. (15)
3. NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which include certain modifications of the B61
bomber and W80 warhead, represent only a small portion of the nuclear arsenal.
Their characteristics are outlined in Table 4:
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Table 4: Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Bomb Yield Weight (lbs.)
(kilotons)
In addition to their short-range capabilities, nonstrategic weapons are generally
smaller and lighter in weight than their strategic counterparts. As a result, their use
is limited to operations in the battlefield, hence the alternative name of a tactical
nuclear weapon.
3.1 SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE
The W80-0 warhead is carried by a BGM-109A-I missile on a Tomahawk
Land Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM-N) weapon system. This weapon system is
aboard a submarine or an airplane. Figure 9 this warhead:
Figure 9: W80-0 Warhead [16]
3.2 NONSTRA TEGIC BOMBS
Nonstrategic bombs consist of Mod 3, Mod 4, and Mod 10 within the B61
class of bombs. They all have variable yield options, and can be carried aboard
aircraft such as F15, F16, and F18s. (1) A dismantled B61 bomb is shown below in
Figure 10:
Figure 10: A Dismantled B61 [17]
4. INFRASTRUCTURE
4.1 DOMESTIC
The nuclear weapons complex describes the eight locations where
experiments on nonnuclear components and analysis of inactive or reserve
warheads are conducted. The operational warheads are on bases associated with
either the Air Force or Navy. The Air Force is in control of approximately 62% of the
operational warheads. (18) The civilian locations and military bases are shown in
Figure 11:
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Locations of U.S. nuclear weapons, 2006
Figure 11: Locations of US nuclear weapons, 2006 [18]
Two naval bases on either coast, one in Bangor, WA and the other in Kings Bay, GA,
are the locations of the SLBM force. Due to increased targeting against countries
such as China, the Pacific coast base now holds about 2,364 warheads while that of
the Atlantic has 1,364. All 3,728 warheads are split between 14 Trident III
submarines in total. The Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota has the largest
number of active weapons, with over 800 bombers and cruise missiles and 400
Minuteman III missiles. (18) The civilian location with nuclear weapons is the
Pantex Plant in Amarillo, TX. Civilian locations without whole nuclear weapons
include: Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, TN; Kansas City Plant in
Kansas City, MO; Savannah River Site in Aiken, SC; Sandia National Laboratories in
Albuquerque, NM, Livermore, CA, Kauai, HI, and Tonopah, NV; Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, CA; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los
Alamos, NM; and the Nevada Test Site in Las Vegas, NV. Two underground sites
hold about 2,800 weapons that are mostly inactive. One site in New Mexico has
about 1,900 in close proximity to the Pantex Plant. The other is in Nevada and holds
about 900 warheads. (18)
4.2 INTERNATIONAL
Although the actual number of nuclear weapons stored both in the US and
internationally remains classified, estimates based on a robust gathering of
information assert that a few hundred nonstrategic bombers, such as the B61-3 and
B61-4, are held in six European countries. (18) These six countries include:
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Britain. (5)
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FORCE
STRUCTURE POLICY
1. DETERRENCE & REDUCTIONS
In the post-Cold War era, there have been two dominant themes in nuclear
weapons policy. The first theme is reduction-both domestic and international.
The second is based on the theory of nuclear deterrence, which "can be defined as
the threat of using nuclear weapons to prevent the enemy from attacking vital
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interests." (4) Deterrence is categorized as either minimum or maximum, and in
terms of force structure, reflects a corresponding small or large number of nuclear
weapons respectively. Moreover, minimum deterrence maintains a clear distinction
between nuclear and convention weapons while maximum deterrence does not. In
an atmosphere that expresses a global interest in nuclear weapons reductions due
to proliferation threats by "non-nuclear" states, follows a shift towards minimum
deterrence.
The themes of deterrence and reductions are apparent in the various areas of
nuclear weapons policy: declaratory, force structure, operational, nonproliferation,
etc. Three main bodies, the US military-mainly the Navy and Air Force, the
technical experts at national laboratories, and Congress are responsible for
developing and enacting these policies. Thus, the policies that currently control
nuclear force structure and its resulting effect on nonproliferation efforts are largely
dependent on the dynamic between these three bodies, and how they can work
together to achieve a balance between national security interests and minimum
deterrence.
2. DETERMINANTS OF FORCE STRUCTURE POLICY
As mentioned in section 1.2, force structure policy describes the political
decisions and consequent actions that determine the specific content, size, and
location of the US nuclear arsenal. The current and future status of nuclear weapons
depend on three key players that make, change, and implement force structure
policy. A thorough analysis of the multifaceted roles of the entities in this complex
interaction reveals that each entity imposes limitations on the others. In an effort to
simplify the dynamic, the military and technical experts can be assumed to work
more or less together as a representative of the executive. In accordance with the
US system of checks and balances, their decisions are offset by those of the
legislative, or Congress. Ultimately, this results in a generally stagnant dynamic, in
which changes to the force structure are best characterized as delayed if not
completely inhibited.
2.1 THE MILITARY
Embedded in the organizational structure of the Department of Defense, the
US military derives its role in nuclear force structure from national defense
principles, strategic policies, and combative goals. The strategy specific to weapon
of mass destruction "will focus military planning, posture, operations, and
capabilities...on the active, forward and layered defense of our nation, our allies,
partners and interests...with an emphasis on defeating threats as far from the
United States as possible." (19) In accordance with this ideology, the military's
Armed Forces, namely the Air Force (USAF) and Navy (USN), and the Commander of
the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) continue to concentrate on nuclear
weapons as one layer of defense.
Although in-depth targeting and employment policy are beyond the scope of
this paper, the assumption is for the military to maintain confidence in an updated
and safe nuclear arsenal. Thus, the military's active role, in addition to the
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collaboration with the technical experts and responsiveness to Congress, is in large
part responsible for the current stockpile and its future evolution.
The parts of the military in charge of nuclear weapons are the USAF, USN,
and Commander of the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and in conjunction
with various parts of the Department of Energy (DOE). They shape nuclear force
structure by placing physical constraints on weapon designs and abilities in order to
carry out effectively, safely, and hypothetically hit a specified target. For example,
one determinant for a certain weapon type in the stockpile is the available delivery
system.
The Navy and Air Force set technical parameters for all of the weapons in the
nuclear arsenal through two sets of'operational specifications': military
characteristics (MCs) and stockpile-to-target sequences (STS). (Aloise, Gene letter)
Following the theme of deterrence, their purpose is to ensure the success of a
military effort using nuclear weapons. The MCs "[are] characteristics of a specific
nuclear weapon upon which its ability to perform desired military
functions...describe required weapons yield and fuzing options; weapons
operational, physical, functional, environmental, vulnerability, safety, and reliability
parameters; describe maintenance, monitoring, storage, and handling
considerations; and set forth the priority of design compliance in the event of
conflicting design requirements." (20) In short, MCs are the characteristics inherent
in the design of the warhead. The stockpile-to-target sequence outlines "logistical
and employment concepts and related physical environments, including
vulnerability criteria, involved in the delivery of a nuclear weapon from the
stockpile to the target... [and] the logistical flow involved in moving nuclear weapons
to and from the stockpile for quality assurance testing, modification and retrofit, and
the recycling of limited-life components." (20) Whereas the MCs are characteristics
inherent in the design of the warhead, the stockpile-to-target sequence requires the
ability of the warhead to move through different environments and conditions.
Together, the MCs and STS documents provide criteria for the design and
preservation of nuclear weapons.
As its name implies, USSTRATCOM is responsible for US strategic weapons.
The commander works directly with and on the same level as the technical experts
in analyzing the development of new weapons in addition to reviewing the old ones.
Specifically, he evaluates weapon types, highlights compensatory measures if
necessary, and admits to any missing or insufficient information. (21) This adds a
necessary military perspective to reports that go through the Secretaries of Defense
and Energy, on to the President and ultimately submitted to Congress.
In general, the military focuses on four main aspects of nuclear weapons
before all other design details. The first is yield. Yield is defined as a "measure of
the amount of explosive energy it can produce." (22) Its unit is in kilotons, which is
equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT. During the Cold War, nuclear competition resulted
in the demand for high yield capabilities for both deterrent purposes and in the case
of an attack. However, analogous to the changing nature of deterrence in the 21st
century is the changing nature of yield to below 5kT. Although disregarded in the
FY2004 Congressional budget decision, a low-yield, earth penetrating weapon
captured military interest due to its ability to destroy biological and buried sites
reducing the otherwise collateral damage. (23) However, the current weapon
systems, developed before or during the Cold War, still reflect the defense
requirement for increased yield.
The second is compatibility with delivery vehicle. As mentioned previously,
many of the specifications developed by the Navy and Air Force result from the
specific delivery systems of the weapons. One major effect on weapons
development resulted from the shift from internal to external transport of the
weapon underneath a wing of modern aircraft, thereby escalating the necessity of
reduced weight. Another example involves the B61 family of bombs. Beginning in
1960, the Air Force disclosed a need for a more versatile weapon that could be
dropped at high and low altitudes while delivering a range of yields. (2)
The third is design safety. A weapon most noted for its safety features is the
W80-0. Electronic components are armored such that critically high temperatures
automatically activate response systems. It also contains both a strong and weak
link in the coding device which prevents unauthorized detonation. Additionally, the
missile is stored within an exterior audio-visual detection system on the ship. (16)
The fourth is reliability, or in other words, a confidence in their ability to hit
the target. The importance of a successful military mission with respect to nuclear
weapons is a national security issue. If a weapon were to fall and fail to detonate, it
could be dismantled, used, and studied for use against the US. For this reason, the
weapon must be able to withstand extreme conditions or obstacles. Hypothetically,
suppose the target is the Iran nuclear facility in Natanz. Satellite imagery in Figure
12 shows that this target and enrichment facility has undergone progressive burial.
Figure 12: Progressive Burial of the Nuclear Facility in Natanz, Iran [11]
Thus, the nuclear weapon must be able to penetrate thousands of feet of rock and
solid ground. This example substantiates the necessity for the B61-11 weapon
system. Commonly referred to as the "bunker buster", its upgraded delivery system
from the Mod 7 allows this warhead to detonate underground.
Currently, the military is engaged in nuclear weapons reductions, following
the post-Cold War policy trend. In order to do this, however, Congress required the
military to explain the logic behind specific reductions. (10) As opposed to the
design and maintenance requirements placed on the technical experts, the military
must also respond to decisions by Congress and guidelines put forth by
international treaties. Congress mainly limits the military programs to modernize
and equip their missiles and defense systems through budgetary action. This
requires a dialogue between the two entities in which Congress receives updates
and reasoning for current programs.
2.2 TECHNICAL EXPERTS
Technical experts refer to those scientists and engineers that design,
construct, and assess current nuclear weapons. Formally part of the executive
branch of government, three laboratories are run by the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), within the organizational structure of the Department of
Energy. The NNSA aims to "assure the safety, security, and reliability of the US
nuclear weapons stockpile while at the same time considering options for
transforming the stockpile and the complex infrastructure that supports it." (24) Of
the three national laboratories, two conduct research and development on the
nuclear warheads specifically, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos. The third,
Sandia National Laboratory, is responsible for the nonnuclear weapon components.
Additionally, the Pantex Plant actively supports the laboratories through
"fabrication of chemical explosives...assembly, disassembly, testing, quality
assurance, repair, retirement, and final disposition." (9)
Technical experts at these civilian nuclear weapons facilities primarily affect
force structure through the Stockpile Stewardship Program as mandated by the
1994 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 103-160). Most of the
literature on this program undoubtedly quotes the current status of US nuclear
weapons as "safe, secure, and reliable". However, this assurance precedes a major
concern within the scientific community-the aging nuclear stockpile. Addressing
this concern, the technical experts have consequently embedded themselves, the
military, and Congress in the debate over renewal or replacement of current
weapon systems. In an effort to make these changes, assumed to be necessary to the
US nuclear force structure, they have devised two main goals to protect not the
present, but the future, reliability and safety of nuclear weapons. These goals are
the Reliable Replacement Warhead and Complex 2030. (24) In doing so, the
technical experts have encountered impediments that are physical, political, and
fiscal in nature, due to the relationships with the military, other labs, and Congress.
First and foremost, the designs of nuclear weapons reflect the ability of the
military to operationalize missions to safely and effectively hit specific targets. In
other words, the military-imposed operational constraints discussed in the previous
section, such as aerodynamic and safety properties must coincide with the
engineering of the nuclear, electrical, and mechanical components. Thus, the
relationship between the military and technical experts is best described as a
partnership between the DOD and DOE. As an illustration, the military objective to
maintain high yield with a simultaneous decrease in weight has resulted in the use
of implosion and boosting principles. In the former, the fissile material is
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compressed such that the heavy metals (uranium or plutonium) effectively liquefy
under extreme pressures. This compression results in a supercritical mass, which is
more efficient than a larger mass, which has more surface area from which neutrons
are lost by escape rather than by fission. This effect is shown below in Figure 13.
Figure 13: "Effect of increased mass of fissionable material in reducing the proportion of
neutrons lost by escape" [22]
Analogous to principles in nuclear reactor theory, efficiency is lessened because loss
of neutrons by escape decreases the percentage of nuclear material that undergoes
fission.
The effect of the incorporation of military engagement with technical
expertise highlights three methodological design and maintenance criteria:
performance, reliability, and safety. Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties
(QMU) provides a measure of performance by relating margins, uncertainties, and
confidence. LANL and LLNL, responsible for the formalization of this method, define
margins, uncertainties, and confidence as follows: (25)
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"Margin is the amount by which the design parameter exceeds that
[value required for a warhead to operate as indicated]-the excess
performance built into the design...Uncertainty results from imprecise
knowledge of design parameters and of the minimum value required
to ensure performance....Confidence is the ratio of margin to
uncertainty: if margin is high and uncertainties low, confidence is
high; if both are high, confidence is low. Having margins greater than
uncertainties provides confidence against potential failure modes."
Reliability, as defined by SNL, reflects the probability of surviving different
environments to reach a target. Formally, it is "the probability of achieving the
specified yield, at the target, across the Stockpile-to-Target Sequence of
environments, throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs." The
third criterion refers to safety features preventing unwanted or uncontrollable
detonation. Thus, the technical experts routinely test the weapons to ensure they
are safe for military handling and storage as well as reliable for military use. As
such, the collaboration between the DOD and DOE is a continuous process, for most
of these safety parameters and design features, such as the yield-to-weight ratios,
need to be maintained.
Currently, the main physical limitation to weapons' assessments is the
inability to conduct nuclear tests as mandated by various congressionally supported
(although not necessarily ratified) arms control agreements, such as the Limited
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1967 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In
this way, foreign policy imposes a legislative constraint on technical analysis and
predictability of the current and future stockpiles. Consequently, the nuclear test
ban affects force structure, for in order to predict the reliability and safety of each
weapon and its components, testing is done via computer simulations and
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experiments. The modeling of specific aspects of the warheads and weapon systems
serves to enlighten the scientists, engineers, and technicians of the complex physical
processes that accompany nuclear explosions. However, due to the nature of, and
inherent error associated with, experiments and simulations, the true complexity of
the implosion must be broken into singular physical processes.
Although experimental methods and simulations allow for close inspection
into the various electrical, mechanical, material, and nuclear components affected by
aging and weapon detonation, these methods are also the only means by which
technical experts can feasibly develop new parts or warheads. While assurance
from the data proved sufficient for the building of new plutonium pits for the W88,
they have not been deemed adequate for the development of a new warhead, as
proposed by the Reliable Replacement Warhead. The latter program, in which a
new warhead was designed for Minuteman III, introduces the financial dependency
of the technical experts on Congress for program funding.
The NNSA receives appropriations as a part of the defense and energy budget
for "weapons activities". In FY2008, Congress appropriated a total of $6.3 million,
$1.4 million of which is concentrated on the technical experts' role in physical force
and infrastructure, otherwise known as "directed stockpile work." The NNSA, as the
direct recipient of these funds, has requested increases in directed stockpile work
from $1.68 million in FY2009 to $1.78 million in 2013. These funds are distributed
as shown in Figure 14:
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FY2008 Directed Stockpile Work
Funding
(in thousands)
Figure 14: FY2008 Directed Stockpile Work Funding
The life extension program (LEP), which accounts for about 17% of total funding for
directed stockpile work, involves replacing parts in the B61, W76, and W80.
Funding for category "systems" refers to the activities such as assessments,
replacements, and outputs of work done on all of the following stockpile systems:
B61, W62, W78, W80, B83, W87, and W88. These activities require approximately
24% of the $1.4 million. The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) receives 0% of
the funding. Dismantlement and disposition activities describe the actions by both
the military and civilian workers at the Pantex Plant to make reductions in the
number of weapons in the arsenal. Ironically, despite the major theme of reductions
in nuclear weapons policy, this is the smallest category, receiving merely 9.6%. At
the other extreme, the largest section, or 49% of total weapons funding, is
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categorized as "services". This pertains to R&D, production, infrastructure, and pit
production.
The funding for "weapons activities" also includes that for experiments and
simulations, represented by four of the six "campaigns" as categorized in the
FY2009 budget request. These campaigns include: Science, Engineering, Inertial
Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield, Advanced Simulation and Computing,
Pit Manufacturing and Certification, and Readiness. Focusing only on conceptual
and experimental scientific methods, the Pit Manufacturing and Certification
Campaign and Readiness Campaign are not relevant. Each of the remaining four
campaigns focuses on different aspects of a theoretical nuclear explosion, receiving
a total of $1.4 million in government funding. The breakdown of this funding is
illustrated in Figure 15:
FY2008 Funding for Experiment and
Simulation Campaigns (in thousands)
Science
o Engineering
Inertial Confinement Fusion
Ignition and High Yield
a Advanced Simulation and
Computing
Figure 15: FY2008 Funding for Experiment and Simulation Campaigns
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In regard to the weapon system itself, the Science Campaign studies the nuclear
components while the Engineering Campaign investigates the engineering of the
nonnuclear and nuclear parts. Taking into account external effects, the Inertial
Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign induces realistic
temperature, pressure, and radiation conditions. Lastly, these experiments
supercomputers motivate these experiments in the Advanced Simulation and
Computing Campaign. Table 5 outlines the title of each division listed under their
respective campaigns as appears in the FY2009 budget request.
Table 5: Activities within each Experiment and Simulation Campaign
Science
Engineering
Inertial
Confinement Fusion
Ignition and High
Yield
Advanced Certification
Primary Assessment Technologies
Dynamic Plutonium Experiments
Dynamic Materials Properties
Advanced Radiography
Secondary Assessment Technologies
Test Readiness
Enhanced Surety
Weapons Systems Engineering Assessment
Technology
Nuclear Survivability
Enhanced Surveillance
Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications
Ion Beam Laboratory Refurbishment Construction
Ignition
Support of Other Stockpile Programs
NIF Diagnostics, Cryogenics, and Experimental
Support
Pulsed Power Inertial Confinement Fusion
University Grants/Other ICF Support
Joint Program in High Energy Density Laboratory
- -- I--- 1 111
Plasmas
Facility Operations and Target Productions
Inertial Fusion Technology
SNIF Assembly and Installation ProgramAdva nced
Simulation and High-Energy Petawatt Laser Development
Computing 96-D-111, National Ignition Facility
Integrated Codes
Physics and Engineering Models
Verification and Validation
Computational Systems and Software Environment
Facility Operations and User Support
In regard to the RRW program, the congressional decision to eliminate
funding for the 2008 fiscal year was in large part due to this diversification of
function shown in Table 5. Due to the lack of technical expertise in Congress,
decisions are made based on the reports and testimonies of various experts and
leaders. The JASON report indicated a strong hesitation for implementing the RRW
for two overwhelming reasons: better correlation between experiments and
simulations in the absence of nuclear testing and peer scientific reviews. (26) A lack
of consensus in the scientific community increases the probability of congressional
debate and in effect, produces decreased or no funding. So, in spite of their
overwhelming dependence on federal funding, the technical experts also affect their
own goals by their ability to effectively present steadfast reasoning to legislators.
Note that after the assurance of the design to abide by the critical military
characteristics, the military's role is reduced in the remainder of this decision-
making process.
2.3 CONGRESS
Unlike the military and the technical experts, Congress, a legislative part of
government, has considerable control over the political and financial decisions
regarding US nuclear weapons. Congress receives information and proposals from
the military and technical experts in order to make decisions that are enforced
through budgetary action. Legislators play a multifaceted role due to their
motivations to protect the best interest of the US, to remain responsible to their
constituency, and to make decisions that allow the US to remain a global leader and
peacemaker.
Many of the ways in which Congress holds control over nuclear weapons
policy have been addressed in previous sections. Both the military and technical
experts both submit testimony and reports in front of the House and Senate
committees and subcommittees. Congress also funds weapons programs, activities,
and research. In addition to these functions, the role of Congress is also explained
by pure politics. When control of both the House and the Senate went to the
Democrats, who are traditionally anti-arms, the funding for the reliable replacement
warhead disappeared.
Moreover, the main purpose of deterrence as an ability to induce large-scale
societal fear suggests a reason behind a strong anti-nuclear sentiment in the US
amidst a period of proliferation and increased national security threats. A
February 20, 2007 poll conducted by the Democracy Corps indicated that 82% of
questioned people in the US feel that more governmental action should be taken to
increase national security over the next decade. An argument could be made that
deterrence is an effective security measure. However, others argue that it is not
really that effective since there was still a catastrophic terrorist attack on 9/11.
They further argue that it promotes the spread of nuclear weapons. Whether or not
deterrence is an effective measure as perceived by the people reflects their attitude
toward ownership of nuclear weapons. Another recent poll by Ipsos-Public Affairs
indicates that 66% of another thousand people believe that no country, including
the US, should have any nuclear weapons. In a system where all Congressional votes
are public and legislators are elected by popular votes, public sentiment is one way
they ascertain what determines the outcome of elections.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE EFFECT ON NONPROLIFERATION
Nuclear proliferation has been a concern since the end of the Cold War,
especially as Russian and the U.S. began to dismantle thousands of weapons. 9/11,
which served in part as an awakening to the reality of terrorist threats, brought this
concern to the forefront of national security. Thus, nonproliferation is extensively
studied and has developed into a separate policy area. While countless factors
contribute to the complexities and problems associated with preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons, force structure policy is one factor that determines the U.S. role
in nonproliferation and resulting international reactions to this role. Without the
trend towards reductions in nuclear policy, US efforts at nonproliferation are
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effectively diminished in the international community. Proving to be a sort of
domino effect, the creation of new warheads simultaneously counteracts
nonproliferation efforts by the US, and consequently, nonproliferation efforts
worldwide.
Despite efforts to cease nuclear proliferation, a counter-argument insists on
the maintenance of the current stockpile in the effort to secure the country against
attacks of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Technical
experts argue that the current nuclear arsenal is potentially weakened by the effects
of aging. This has resulted in programs to improve current weapons, through
production of new plutonium pits and the life extension programs, as well as
incentives to replace weapons entirely through the reliable replacement warhead
program. Working together with the DOD, the military supports any measure that
increases reliability and safety in handling the current weapons. However, the
scientific community argues over the absolute need for new weapons. This
hesitation is backed by Congress, who responding to a generally anti-nuclear
weapon American public and a proliferating international community, has halted
funding for the reliable replacement warhead program. The stagnancy of US nuclear
weapons policy is due to the controversy stemming from upholding deterrence for
national security versus meeting the global expectation for nuclear arms reductions.
The relationship between the three governmental groups in control of this policy
area contributes to the controversy, and in turn, to the prevention of any significant
changes to the current nuclear arsenal.
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